

Affidavit of Examination of the Witness Nohara Komakichi

Moscow, February 15, 1946.

Nohara Komakichi, born in 1899, a native of Yokohama (Japan). A Japanese subject. Non-party member. Family: Wife and son. School and university education received in Europe, graduated from the faculty of philosophy at the University in Basle and Berlin. From 1922 till 1939 he lived in Europe, the United States of America, South America and Japan. He was a journalist. Has never been tried. From the 1st of September 1939 till the 21st of April 1945 he was an assistant of a press-agent of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. At present he is in the U.S.S.R. as an internee.

I have been warned of the responsibility for false testimony. I am informed of the contents of Chapter 25 of R.T.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

The examination is being conducted in the Japanese Language, with translation into Russian by the interpreter Rosenbaum E. G. The interpreter Rosenbaum E. G. is warned of the responsibility for the correctness of the translation, according to Chapter 98 of the R.T.F.S.R. Criminal Code.

Question: When and where were you detained by the units of the Red Army?

Answer: I was detained by the units of the Red Army on the 21st of April 1945 in the suburb of Berlin, in Shtrausberg, 40 kilometres to the East of Berlin.

Question: Why were you in the area of military operations and not at the Japanese Embassy in Berlin on the 21st of April, 1945?

Answer: It happened, because I always lived in Shtrausberg, where my family was. I didn't want to part with them in such troublesome time. Last time I worked at the Japanese Embassy on the 16th of April, 1945, later on I was not able to go to Berlin, because the railway between Berlin and Shtrausberg was destroyed.

Question: Explain the origin and nature of the present German and English documents, which were found about you by the Red Army officer at the time of your arrest and explain why those documents were on you.

Answer: The present documents on four sheets of paper which were actually found on me, belonged in the past to the Japanese Embassy in Berlin. As I was a convinced antifascist I was against the war of Japan and Germany against the Soviet Union and her allies. I deliberately kept those documents and intended to use them in the interest of the allies, as I was sure that the day would come when these documents would to a certain extent expose the Japanese war criminals, who had provoked the war against the peace-loving countries and brought their country and their people to a catastrophe. Therefore, I kept those documents and made no attempt to hide or destroy them. When on the 21st of April 1945 I was taken in Shtrausberg I handed them over to the Soviet officer. The greater part of these documents were secret. Though it was not my immediate duty, as a press-agent, to deal with documents of that kind, yet I was made to be concerned with secret work by the counselor of the Embassy Kavahara Sin. My duty was to work at the documents of military and other secret information. The work was considered to be top secret and nobody but Ambassador Oshima, the counselor of the Embassy Kavahara and me were initiated in it. The greater part of the present documents which were found about me are copies of memorandums, containing secret information about the number and disposition of the units of the Red Army, its equipment and supplies, the state of the war industry of the Soviet Union and its production: planes, tanks and also man-power of the U.S.S.R. The Japanese Embassy in Berlin received military information of similar nature about the Soviet Union from Japanese Ambassadors in Moscow Tatekava and Sato in the form of ciphered telegrams, at which the Counselor Kavahara and me worked afterwards and translated into German. Afterwards the Japanese Embassy in Berlin passed that information to the German Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

Question: You are being shown the document of the 19th of January 1945, headed "War potential of the Soviet Russia", in which figures of planes, tanks, oil, etc., produced in the Soviet Union, are omitted. By whom and when was the document drawn up and what does the omission of the figures mean?

Answer: This document was drawn up by the Counselor Kava-hara and me in January, 1945, on the ground of the information, received from Sato, the Japanese Ambassador in Moscow. The omission of the figures is made by the Counselor Kava-hara; he wrote them in hand in the 1st copy and handed the copy as it was, to the Germans. This information Kava-hara considered top secret.

Question: Among the documents found about you, there is a document under the title of "On the strength of the Red Army". There is a mark, made in your hand on this document, stating that on the 21st of January, 1942, the military attache in the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, through us, handed the following information to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Under the document it is written in your hand that "on the 22nd of January, 1942, that information was in the hands of the German Commander-in-Chief". Explain what those marks on that document mean.

Answer: This document is a record of secret information received by the Japanese Embassy in Berlin from the Japanese attache in Moscow on the 21st of January, 1942. That's how the origin of this information was explained to me orally by the Counsel of the Embassy Kava-hara. The record is reproduced by me in this document on the ground of draft copies. The next day, on the 22nd of January, after Kava-hara and me had worked up this document, the Counselor Kava-hara personally handed it to the German Foreign Office. As to the delivery of secret information about the Allies to the Germans by the Japanese Embassy in Berlin, I want to say in addition that from 1939 till 1945 the Japanese Embassy handed, as far as I remember, about 40 communiques to the Germans whenever they were coming from Moscow, London and Tokyo. The contents of those materials, mainly, refer to war-economic power of the U.S.S.R. and her Allies. Part of the materials were summaries of certain investigations concerning different problems, other materials were results of personal observations of the Japanese who passed through the Soviet Union in war-time.

Question: Was anything known to you about the agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in 1941?

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Question: Was anything known to you about the agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, signed in 1941?

Answer: Yes, I, as well as the rest of the Japanese Embassy staff in Berlin, knew of the existence of such an agreement.

Question: By whose orders did the Japanese Embassy in Berlin pass the secret information about the U.S.S.R. to the Germans?

Answer: By the order from Tokyo and the personal order of Ambassador Oshima.

Question: In this case, how will you characterize the actions of the Japanese authorities and their representative Oshima, the Ambassador in Berlin?

Answer: Since there was an agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union, the delivery to Germany of secret military and other information about the U.S.S.R. helped to a certain extent Germany in her war against the Soviet Union and, consequently, was a breach of the agreement of neutrality. Ambassador Oshima, as a representative of the Japanese Government did not want to consider and fulfill the agreement of neutrality between Japan and the Soviet Union. In his practical activity he was guided by the ideological alliance, the so-called "anti-komintern pact", a military union between Germany, Japan and Italy. Oshima being an active partisan and conductor of the Japanese Government's anti-Soviet policy, in this respect his activity directly contributed to the latter.

Question: Characterize the activity of Oshima Hiroshi, as Ambassador of Japan in Berlin.

Answer: The activity of Oshima, as well as his political face, have been sufficiently described by me above. I only want to add the following: Oshima Hiroshi is a convinced partisan of fascism of the German type and an irreconcilable enemy of the U.S.S.R., England and the U.S.A. He contributed to a large extent to conclusion of a military agreement between Germany, Japan and Italy, being the Japanese military attache in Berlin. During the celebration of the anniversary of the Mukden battle (the victory of the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905), Oshima said at a banquet in Berlin: "I am drinking Russian vodka and think that I am drinking Russia". The complete Oshima's confidence in power of Germany was well-known not only at the Embassy but

to the Germans as well. Goering, Keitel, Himmler and other notorious leaders of Germany were often invited by Ambassador Oshima to banquets at the Embassy. Hitler was once present there. Goering was reluctant of visiting the Embassy (he did not conceal his unfriendliness towards the Japanese, but Himmler and other leaders of "S.S." frequently called on Oshima and in their turn invited him to them. Oshima knows the German Language quite well and therefore he never took an interpreter along while visiting the Germans. In this way his talks with the Hitlerites were held in privacy and their topics are unknown to me. With the help of Himmler and his assistants Oshima travelled in Germany a lot and the Germans trusting Oshima showed him very much. It was also with their assistance that Oshima, accompanied by the Japanese military attache in 1942 or 1943 made a trip to the Soviet-German front. He was in the Ukraine, I think in Kamensk or Kamenka. The fact that he was an Ambassador of Japan, which had an agreement of neutrality with the U.S.S.R., did not embarrass him in the least. He thought it quite appropriate to stay on the Soviet territory, occupied by the Germans. Oshima has always been an advocate of a joint military attack of Japan and Germany on the U.S.S.R. In this respect the following episode is characteristic. Immediately after the attack of Germany against the Soviet Union on the 22 - 23rd of June 1941, a ciphered telegram was received in Tokyo, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the meaning of which was approximately the following: "In connection with the present situation Japan would guard the Pacific Ocean in the spirits of anti-komintern pact." Oshima summoned the counselor Kawahara and me and asked for our opinion. Kawahara and I declared that, according to the meaning of the telegram Japan will not attack the U.S.S.R. Oshima tried to prove the opposite, pointing out that "the guard of the Pacific Ocean" meant war of Japan against the U.S.S.R. Oshima, infuriated by vagueness of the telegram, ordered the telegram to be sent to the Germans in the form it was received, without paraphrasing the text and translating it from English into German. The reply of the Germans is unknown to me. Oshima completely shared the so-called "theory" of racial domination, exposed in Hitler's book "Mein Kampf". When other Japanese made hints to Oshima that Hitler spoke about the Japanese as well as of inferior creatures, Oshima answered that it was Hitler's mistake and that he would ask the author to introduce correspondent corrections in the book. Oshima ignored facts that were

common knowledge about the Hitlerites' atrocities within their own country and on the occupied territory of the Soviet Union. He considered these to be false, saying that they were only lies and enemy propaganda. As a matter of fact, obligingness and servility of Oshima towards the Germans were boundless. The case of a Japanese professor Sakimura may serve as an example of it. Being sent on commission by a Japanese Metallurgical concern to Germany Sakimura in 1943 or 1944 left for Sweden, where in an interview given to an English correspondent declared that Germany would lose the war through shortage of iron and on the whole he denounced German fascism. In connection with the protests of the Germans there was an exchange of notes between Oshima and the Germans three times. In his last note Oshima informed the Germans that he did not object to the delivery of Sakimura to the Gestapo. This is an indisputable fact, as I myself put the technical touches to the note. This action of Oshima caused great indignation even among pro-fascist Japanese. I don't know what has become of Sakimura, as he did not live in the Embassy and I lost sight of him. Military attaches generals Banzai and Komatsu and navy attaches Iokoi and Kodzima were the most intimate people, with whom Oshima had close connections. He constantly kept company with them as all of them cultivated profascist sentiments. Finally, the last stage of Oshima's career in Germany was also connected with Oshima's complete confidence in strength and possibility of the Germans. When in April 1945 the situation became alarming in Berlin, Oshima accepted the Germans' offer to move to the South of Germany as he believed the Germans that they would be able to continue a lasting resistance in the South. On the 14th of April 1945 Oshima with the Embassy went to Bad Gashtein, to the south of Salzburg in motor cars. Since then I haven't heard anything new about Oshima. In Berlin, the Counselor Kawahara, a diplomatic attache, the Japanese consul and two or three officials were left in Berlin to contact with separate members of the German Cabinet. I stayed because of the pointed out at the beginning. The testimony is written from my words correctly and is translated into Japanese to me.

Nohara

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The examination began at 5 o'clock
The examination ended at 9 o'clock.

Examined: Lieutenant-Colonel Petrov,

The interpreter Rosenbaum

Heptebus Kejobs

CERTIFICATE OF TRANSLATION OF THE ABOVE DOCUMENT

I, M. GILDENBLAT, hereby certify that I am thoroughly conversant with the Russian and English languages: and the above is a correct and true translation of the indicated Document.

Signature: _____

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19 January 1945

Confidential

WAR POTENTIAL OF SOVIET RUSSIA

Favorable development of the military status of Soviet Russia and the reconquering of her lost regions has resulted not only in the moral but also in the material strengthening of the war potential of Soviet Russia.

The production of aircraft, tanks, vessels, coal, oil iron, steel, and other war materials has increased though the basic industries have not yet reached the pre-war production level. Rebuilding in reconquered regions has already begun, but still Soviet Russia, in restoring her war industry, relies on the aid from abroad to a large extent.

As far as food-stuffs are concerned, restoration in the reconquered territories is comparatively rapid and therefore in view of last year's good harvest, the breakdown of the Russian war potential due to the lack of food-stuffs is unthinkable. Russian armed forces and workers can maintain their former efficiency.

The patriotic movement in Russia, the friendly attitude of the government towards religion, as well as a number of economic measures have led to the revival of the national spirit. On the whole, it can be confirmed that the war potential of Soviet Russia has notably increased.

PRODUCTION OF WAR MATERIALS

AIRCRAFT

Production per month in December 1944 _____

Number of aircraft received from abroad
until April 1944 _____

(Average monthly delivery: _____)

Number of aircraft in disposition on
the first front against Germany _____

Number of aircraft in use in the
eastern regions of the USSR _____

TANKS

Production per month in December 1944 _____

Number of tanks imported from abroad
until April 1944 _____

(Average monthly delivery: _____)

Number of tanks on the fronts: _____

Against Germany _____

In eastern regions of the USSR _____

VESSELS

Number of vessels built in 1944:
10 with the total tonnage of 120,000 tons.

COAL

The restoration of coal mines in the Donetz Basin has not made any noticeable progress. At the end of 1944 the daily output of the Basin amounted to from 75,000 to 100,000 tons. However, there are possibilities of increasing the output in the Alaganda and Uzbekistan regions. The output of coal in Soviet Russia in 1944 amounted to 130,000,000 tons.

OIL

The production of oil in 1944, including the Rumanian and the Polish oil fields amounted to 38,000,000 tons. The amount of aviation petrol imported from abroad before April 1944 _____
(Average delivery per month: _____)

IRON and STEEL

Iron industry of the Donetz Basin has not been restored in full measure, though there are possibilities of increasing production in the Urals and in Uzbekistan. The production of steel in 1944 amounted to 11,500,000 tons.

ALUMINUM

Production in 1944 - from 100,000 to 120,000 tons.
Importation from abroad before April 1944 _____
(Average amount per month _____)

COPPER

Production in 1944 - 200,000 tons. Importation of copper and copper wares from abroad before April 1944 - 240,000 tons.

AUTOMOBILES

Production in 1944 - 200,000. Importation from abroad before April 1944 - 220,000.

MANPOWER

Number of mobilized forces _____ men.

Total losses since the beginning of the war - 11,000,000

Reserves able to be mobilized: from 1,000,000 to 3,000,000 men.

Manpower in use on the Soviet-German front _____ men.

In eastern regions of the USSR _____ men.

Number of workers engaged in war work --

71,600,000

Among them: 28,200,000 men
43,400,000 women

Reserves of labor power from 3,000,000 to 3,500,000

FOOD SITUATION

Cereal Production in 1944 - 46,800,000 tons

etc. etc.

(Written in handwriting) On 21 January 1942, the Military Attache at the Japanese Embassy in Moscow let the following report go through us to the German Foreign Office:

Confidential

The Strength of the Soviet Russian
Armed Forces

According to information received by the Rumanian General Staff the aspect of the strength of the Red Army at the beginning of December 1941 is as follows:

Strength of Russian troops before the beginning
of the Russian-German war:

European Russia:

Infantry	146 divisions
Cavalry	27 "
Armored forces	35 "
Total	208 "

Far East:

Infantry	25 divisions
Cavalry	20 "
Armored Forces	5 "
Total	50 "

The strength of Russian troops increased by mobiliza-
tion since the beginning of the war:

Total strength - 340-350 divisions

Losses during the war:

(until the beginning of December 1941)

Infantry	215-220 divisions
Cavalry	15-20 "
Armored Forces	20-22 "

(Translator's note
corrected by hand;
originally types:
"10-20")

etc.

(Written by hand under the printed text on lower margin of the document)

"On January 22, 1942 this information was in the hands of the German commander-in-chief."